The European Union as a Security Actor on the International Stage: Toward a European Army?

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1. PREMISES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SECURITY POLICY

1) The first and most important premise was the aspiration –embodied in the very notion of European integration– to maintain peace in Europe, which had been heavily scarred by wars, two of which were worldwide conflicts. The process of European integration was meant to bring conflicted nations closer together, to create functional interdependencies, and to produce benefits in the form of rising living standards, all of which were supposed to make the pursuit of war unprofitable, irrational and undesirable. In the first half of the 1950s, those who initiated this integration process reaffirmed their intentions by proposing to establish a European Defense Community and a European Political Community.

2) Then came the need for the countries making up the European communities to speak with one voice about ongoing international conflicts (in the Middle East, for example), and to search for effective means to reduce tensions and reinforce security in Europe (CSCE). This need was answered by the initiation in 1970 of European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism for countries making up the European communities to coordinate their foreign policy. In the second half of that decade, so-called ‘soft’ aspects of security came to be included in the deliberations of EC foreign ministers, and during the decade that followed so did military questions, with the exclusion of defense matters, however. The need to strengthen EPC in order to create a common foreign and security policy was due to the international challenges facing EC member states, and to recurring threats to international security. The relevant discussions between EC member states were reflected in joint reports proposing to strengthen EPC and in projects calling for the establishment of the European Union. The greatest contributions to the formulation of the concept of the EU as an institution
conducted a joint foreign and security policy were made by France and the Federal Republic of Germany (Zięba 2006: 169-184).

3) In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the transformation process taking place in Central and Eastern Europe provided strong new impulses for the creation of a joint foreign and security policy by the states of integrating Europe. The downfall of the political system of real socialism, followed by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, created new challenges for the policies of the stable and rapidly growing countries of Western Europe. The democratic transformations taking place in the eastern part of the continent constituted a fulfillment of the West’s expectations on the one hand, and gave rise to new challenges, notably the need to support the ongoing reforms politically and economically on the other. At the same time, in many countries one side effect of the systemic transformations was destabilization spreading to other countries, as happened during the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Moreover, economic difficulties caused political instability and strong migration pressure.

4) The rapid process of German unification, which began in November 1989, provided another important premise for stepping up work on the formation and institution of a joint foreign and security policy. Although it was, from the beginning, controlled by the pro-European oriented German Christian-Democrats, and unfolded under the patronage of the four powers responsible for Germany as a whole (the USA, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom), it nevertheless caused some anxiety for many of Germany’s European allies and partners. For this reason, they decided that the best way to ensure the maintenance of the pro-European course in united Germany’s foreign policy would be to anchor Germany firmly in the West’s integration structures. The common foreign and security policy –proposed by French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl– seemed the most effective path to ‘Europeanize’ Germany as a whole and getting that country to abandon its nationalist tradition.

5) After the Cold War, a high degree of military threat still existed. Although the outbreak of a global nuclear conflict between East and West was no longer likely, a high level of conventional armaments, large stockpiles of chemical weapons, the illegal arms trade and the proliferation of nuclear weapons continued to be factors of threat. Threats arising for the rise of trans-national crime and organized terrorism also grew.

6) The evolution of the international order in Europe and in the world provided yet another premise for the institution of a joint foreign and security policy within the European Union framework. The disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union created the need to ‘develop’ the zone of uncertainty and ‘security vacuum’ that arose in their place. An important concern was who would participate in this endeavor and how to prevent the recurrence of great power rivalry, which had often been present in earlier historical periods. The greatest fears that history might repeat itself emerged
in the new democratic states of Central Europe. Such fears were not absent among West European politicians, however. Russia and Germany especially were suspected of harboring hegemonistic ambitions. For the European Union, which was just emerging on the international stage, the desire to keep up with the United States, which was showing a vivid interest in the transformation of Central and Eastern European states, provided a serious motivation for increased engagement in this region.

7) The desire to reinforce the European element of the NATO security system and to strengthen its autonomy was another motive guiding the planning of states engaged in the process of European integration. The chief proponent of the second option was France. Attempts to increase the weight of Western Europe in NATO in the 1970s following détente and to revitalize the Western European Union were meant to produce stronger security guarantees. The absence of an automatic application mechanism in the formulation of the casus foederis of the North Atlantic Treaty (art. 5) inclined the European NATO allies to seek arrangements that would strengthen their importance within NATO and on the international stage. The establishment of the EU created the temptation to equip it with a security component that would be all its own, or one only shared with NATO. Understandably, by working for the prosperity of its citizens, EU member states wished to create instruments for the Union’s defense.

EU member states, in working on the European Union project, had to take into consideration emerging challenges and threats to international security. The more so as all those phenomena entailed negative repercussions for the Economic and Monetary Union and for the international prestige of the Community. Taking up challenges and eliminating threats was only possible through close collaboration between the EU Twelve. This necessitated the establishment of a common foreign and security policy (the II EU pillar), and when this was done it was necessary to reinforce it by creating a common defense policy and instituting collaboration in the spheres of justice and home affairs (as part of the so-called III EU pillar).

8) European Community member states decided to create the European Union not only to increase the effectiveness of their collaboration in the integration process, but also to gain instruments that would allow the integrating Europe to increase its international role. This aim can only be met by common diplomatic activity supported by civilian and military instruments of security policy. Therefore, an increased international role for the EU depends on whether it will be a comprehensive actor on the world stage.

2. THE CONCEPT OF THE EU SECURITY POLICY

Initially, EU security policy was treated solely as part of EU internal relations. This was most probably due to the traditional perception of security as the elimination of external threats to the growing EU, without considering actions dealing with threats
arising from within the EU itself. Similarly, member states also perceived their national security in the context of threats originating beyond their borders. The European Union, however, took shape as an international community made up of nation states and a considerable share of threats arose within EU member states and spread between them. There was thus a need to develop international cooperation within the framework of the so-called third pillar instituted by the Maastricht Treaty—i.e., in the field of justice and home affairs. In EU program documents, however, traditional security was treated in the context of threats arising beyond EU borders. This changed on 1 December 2009 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which abolished the division of the EU into three pillars and whose provisions treat the EU as a unified international organization.

2.1. Security as a Goal of the European Union

The European Union Treaty treats security in a twofold manner. Firstly, it states that the goal of the EU is to “offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers” (art. 3.2); and secondly, in external relations, the EU “shall contribute peace, [and] security” (art. 3.5). In the latter area of competence, the EU defines this goal in greater detail, as to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders” (art. 21.2c).

The above norms are of an auxiliary nature with regard to the security policies of nation states, because in the subsequent article, the Treaty states that the Union ‘shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State’ (art. 4.2 TEU). This means that questions of security remain primarily within the competence of member states and that the European Union is an institution that supports and complements their actions in this respect. The EU security policy includes only actions that have been jointly agreed upon by the governments of member states. This ascertainment is important to make and should keep us from formulating excessive expectations of the European Union, and from undue criticism of its limited attainments as a security policy actor.

The European Union Treaty only contains a general definition of security, which is treated in greater detail in strategic documents and in regulations pertaining to the instruments and methods of ensuring security.

2.2. The Instruments and Methods of EU Security Policy

The EU Treaty states that the Union’s security is ensured through the use of all instruments at the EU’s disposal, i.e., including the instruments of its sectoral policies.
They were defined first and in the widest sense in connection with external relations through the Maastricht Treaty’s distinguishing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, they have formed part of Title V of the presently applicable EU Treaty.

A difficulty arises in setting aside security policy means and methods, because the EU Treaty treats them jointly in relation to the entire CFSP, while the scope of this policy is defined as “all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy that might lead to a common defense” (art. 24.1 TEU).

It should be noted that when the European Union was created in the early 1990s, matters of defense were not included in the CFSP. The EU Treaty provided only for the “eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense,” should the European Council so decide (art. J.4). In the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU was left as a distinct organization, although one that “is an integral part of the development of the [European] Union,” to which the EU will turn with a request “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the [European] Union which have defence implications” (art. J.4).

Thus, for a certain time, military and defense matters were de facto excluded from the scope of application of the CFSP and left within the competence of the WEU, to which the majority of EU member states belonged. The WEU, which was NATO’s European pillar at the time, thus gained the status of the European Union’s defense component. A clear distinction between security and defense matters was thus inserted in the EU’s founding treaty, in which security relates to ‘soft’ matters, such as the supply of arms and disarmament, while defense was defined as an area encompassing planning and the use of military force. Security became the domain of the second EU pillar (CFSP), while defense was left for a time within the competence of the Western European Union, which was made the executor of EU decisions of a military character.2

A new provision introduced into the Amsterdam Treaty (which came into force on 1 May 1999) played an important role in the strengthening of the CFSP. It stipulated that the WEU (as an integral part of the EU’s development) would ensure operational capability to carry out the Petersberg Tasks.3 Such missions could thus be conducted by both by the WEU and the EU. The WEU only conducted a few such operations of limited scope, and the EU was not able to embark on any large scale military operation.

Drawing conclusions from this state of powerlessness, in 1999 the European Union proclaimed the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (Zięba 2005; Ciupiński). By the middle of 2001, the EU took over the resources and
operational capabilities of the WEU, leaving the Brussels Treaty in force. Ultimately, the Lisbon Treaty provided the legal basis for the EU’s defense policy, which was re-baptized the Common Security and Defense Policy. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, in 2010 the Brussels Treaty expired but the CSDP—despite its institutional expansion—did not actually begin to function and found itself in a state of deep economic stagnation after the economic crisis of 2008-2011.

The most important new regulations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty had to do with expanding the CFSP to include military aspects. One novelty was extending the existing enhanced cooperation to all areas that were not in the exclusive competence of the European Union, including to military and defense areas that had been excluded until then (art. 20 TEU). The pre-condition for this is the participation of 9 states (an increased threshold, from 8). A special new form of enhanced cooperation is the possibility of establishing a permanent structured cooperation open for all member states within the framework of the Union, by states which meet higher military capability criteria and which undertook to carry out more demanding missions (art. 42 and 46 TEU). This new approach reflects a tendency which has been visible for a few years and which undermines the Union’s cohesion and even undermines the European integration process by differentiating the status of its member states. This danger only increased after the Lisbon Treaty came into force.

The most important change pointing to the EU’s ambition to become a full-fledged security policy actor was the introduction into the Treaty of a casus foederis type clause, as is the case for military alliances. It stipulates that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”. This important obligation is not made any weaker by the addition of the reservation that “this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States”. This has no influence on the special character of the security and defense policy of certain member states. “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation” (art. 42.7). This new provision clearly indicates that the European Union has declared its intent to become a territorial defense organization on the model of a military alliance.

The Lisbon Treaty has also widened the catalogue of crisis management operations (Petersberg Tasks) to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance missions and the support of third countries in combating terrorism (as separate missions or as an element of other missions—art. 43.1 TEU). The new treaty
defined in detail the European Defense Agency’s tasks, which include the formulation of member states’ military capability targets, supporting the harmonization of operational requirements, the establishment of effective and cohesive procurement methods, supporting research on new type of armaments, contributing to the reinforcement of the industrial and technological base of the defense sector, and increasing the effectiveness of military expenditures (art. 45 TEU). The solidarity clause included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and binding the Union and its member states to extend all manner of assistance to a state being the object of a terrorist attack, the victim of a natural disaster or of a man-made catastrophe is related to the CSDP (art. 222 TFEU). The clause/principle of conducting the EU’s energy policy in keeping with the spirit of solidarity and as part of a common market was also included (art. 194 TFEU).

In light of the Lisbon Treaty, presently in force, the present instruments of the CFSP are:

1) defining the general guidelines,
2) adopting decisions defining:
   (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union,
   (ii) positions to be taken by the Union,
   (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii); and by
3) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy (art. 25)

The means of the EU security policy should also be seen in relation to the shaping of internal security, i.e., an area of freedom, security and justice. They are provided in Title V of the TFEU, and concern border control, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, and police cooperation.

The character of the CFSP and of actions conducted as part of the EU’s internal security is that of concerted multilateral actions conducted on a collaborative basis and in concordance with international law. The methods used can be of a positive, neutral or negative nature. The latter method can be used in support of joint positions and joint action by means of political pressure and economic sanctions.

3. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN ARMY

In order for the European Union to be able to conduct an effective security policy, possessing the appropriate resources and abilities —especially military ones making up the Common Security and Defense Policy— are of fundamental importance.

It was initially thought in the European Union that conducting effective rapid response operations would necessitate substantial military rapid reaction forces
which were not intended as a European Army, but only as a pool of forces made up of national units. In 1999, the European Council, during its meetings in Cologne and Helsinki, decided that such forces, numbering at least 60,000 soldiers (a corps) would be established. Its organization was to be based on the voluntary contributions made by EU members and associated states (bottom-up approach). As early as November 2001, EU member states (with the exception of Denmark, which decided to opt out of the ESDP) and EU candidate countries declared they were ready to contribute a total of over 100,000 soldiers, about 400 combat airplanes and 100 warships. All those contributions existed only in the form of declarations on paper, and the forces submitted for ESDP needs were characterized by numerous shortfalls and deficiencies/deficits, which made their effective use in conflict areas impossible. Despite further decisions taken at the EU level in the following years, no large European rapid reaction force was created.

During the work on the so-called Military Rapid Response Concept which began in the fall of 2002, in April 2004 it was decided to create some EU Battlegroups. It was assumed that units of this type should number up to 1,500 soldiers and be capable to be deployed in a conflict area within 15 days. The battlegroups so conceived did take shape and, since 1 January 2007, two groups ready to be deployed in a conflict area have been on permanent duty. They have never been used in operational action, however, even though the European Union has been conducting civilian and military crisis response operations since 2003 (Grevi, Helly & Keohane; Hughes; Gross & Juncos).

Further work on generating military capabilities were conducted by the project groups created in May 2003 (and which replaced the expert panels which had been active since February 2002). During 2003 a total of 15 were established. They were also not very formal in character and the results of their work had to be approved at an appropriately high level of EU member state representatives. Progress was slight, however. Given this, in June 2004 it was decided to adopt a new European Headline Goal 2010 and concentrate on the establishment of the European Defense Agency, which took over the main tasks involved in generating new crisis response capabilities.

States participating in the ESDP took up initiatives aimed to meet the shortcomings in all types of armed forces, including, first of all, in naval (until 2007), air and air defense (until 2009) forces. The worst situation was to be found with the ground forces where, for 20 identified shortcomings, specific action plans were given with respect to only 3, and in many areas no initiatives whatsoever were taken to expand their defense potential. This meant that the European Union does not possess, and would not during the subsequent years, the capability to conduct autonomously Petersberg operations of all types, and this would result in a prolongation of the
EU’s dependence on the potential of NATO and of the national armed forces of EU member states. Conceptual work on the building of new types, i.e., naval and air, EU rapid reaction forces are ongoing.

Generally speaking, it should be noted that the European Union, in building its military capabilities to conduct rapid reaction operations has met with a number of obstacles along the way. These can be reduced to three essential problems: Firstly, difficulties in increasing defense budgets; secondly, difficulties in transforming armed forces from territorial defense forces to intervention and expeditionary forces; thirdly, time needed to make up for shortcomings and shortages.

The financial crisis which began in the fall of 2008 has hit most EU member states hard. Most of them experienced serious problems with balancing their budgets. This led to falling defense expenditures (to 1.0-1.5% of GDP), disturbances in the euro zone, and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which strengthened the intergovernmental character of the EU– to strong tendencies among EU member states to renationalize the policies. The United Kingdom, which was one of the three main initiators of the ESDP (having joined the position of France and Germany in 1998) even opted in a referendum on 23 June 2016 for leaving the EU.

In 2009-2011, France, Germany and Poland took steps to revive the CSDP, but those efforts were scuttled by London (Zięba 2012: 166-167; Zając 453-454). In subsequent years the European Union entered a period of deep crisis as an integration and political project. For this reason its Common Security and Defense Policy is stagnating. The European Union failed to generate sufficient armed forces to conduct large scale crisis response operations. The United States are not able and do not wish to deal with all crises. The European Union needs its own soldiers for this purpose. In this situation, from time to time politicians of EU member states put forward various proposals to establish a European army. These proposals have not always been thought through or consulted with EU partners.

Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński did so during a visit to Berlin at the end of October 2006. He presented German Chancellor Angela Merkel with the idea of a 100,000-strong European army, to be subordinated to the President of the European Commission, but commanded by NATO Headquarters (Wieliński). The Germans were taken aback by the proposal, for two reasons. Firstly, because the European Commission does not deal with EU defense policy and has no experience in the matter, and secondly, the idea of placing this army under NATO command could signify that it would de facto be subordinated to the Americans, who have most to say in NATO, and this would defeat the very purpose of creating a EU army. The Polish prime minister’s point of view was supported by President Lech Kaczyński who, in an interview given a few days later to the Financial Times, also stated that
a 100,000-strong army tied to NATO should be established to defend Europe and to be sent to various trouble spots (Cienski and Wagstyl). The credibility of Poland’s proposal was undermined by the fact that, at the time, Warsaw called for rejecting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe while, simultaneously, the Polish president claimed that the European Union should remain an association of states, and not a federation. It was thus difficult to build large EU armed forces while insisting on an EU that was intergovernmental in character.

Nonetheless, the eurosceptical Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) party maintained its position in subsequent years as well. In September 2011, during the Economic Forum in Krynica, its leader Jarosław Kaczyński said that the formation of a common army by the European Union would give the EU the status of a superpower comparable with the United States (“Military unity could make EU a superpower: Kaczynski”).

In 2015, a new impulse for discussions about providing the European Union with its own armed forces was given by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker who, on the pages of German weekly Welt am Sonntag, called on EU member states to establish a common European army. In his opinion, such armed forces could more effectively ensure security for Europe, and an EU in possession of its own army could more credibly react to threats to peace in EU member states or in neighboring countries. He added that it would also send the message to Russia that “we take our intention to defend European values seriously” (“Wspólna europejska armia?”).

Junker’s initiative was presented when the results of work on a new security strategy conducted by the groups of experts working under the chairmanship of Javier Solana –former NATO secretary general and head of the EU diplomatic service– were already known. These results were set out in a report entitled More Union in European Defence. This document states that the ultimate and indispensable aim of defense integration should be the creation of a European Defense Union (EDU). This report defines the shape of such a Union as a cornerstone of a comprehensive civilian and military security architecture in Europe. Its recommendations include concentrating on territorial defense contributions that would complement those of NATO and creating within the EU framework “political and military capabilities” for the EU to carry out interventions beyond EU borders. Moreover, experts proposed the creation of an EU military general headquarters in Brussels (“More Union in European Defence”).

Juncker’s initiative of creation of a European army was assessed by other experts as feasible within the framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty of “permanent structured cooperation,” but as a condition of its realization indicated the use of “a Schengen approach to defense integration, ambitious and pragmatic at the same time, building on those member states which are engaged in deeper cooperation already” (Janning).
After a decisive referendum on leaving the UK with the EU have intensified calls to create a European army. European politicians realized that Brexit will mean a weakening of the EU’s military capabilities, but at the same time getting rid of a country that always blocked the military ambitions of the EU for fear of creating competition for NATO. From a purely military point of view Brexit means for the EU a major weakness. And although security guarantees to Europe from the UK will not disappear, because the result of NATO membership, but the EU will be even more difficult to carry out military missions abroad. Unless quantitative weakness offsetting a qualitative jump in the military cooperation, what some politicians call for.

In Summer 2016 for closer military cooperation within the EU have urged leaders of France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Polish Euro-sceptic leader –Jarosław Kaczyński (“Kaczyński: Musimy wyjść z inicjatywą zmian UE”). The most concrete plan presented Foreign and Defense Ministers of Italy, who proposed the creation of a defense Schengen, which is limited to a group of countries a greater defense cooperation on the model of the area without border controls. German minister of defense Ursula von der Leyen proposed to create “European Defense Union” (“Skutki Brexitu: Europejska armia bez Brytyjczyków”; “Niemiecka minister obrony chce europejskiej unii obronnej”), and together with her French colleague Jean-Yves Le Drian developed a document in which they demand the creation of a “road map” of further steps. Ministers proposed the creation of a EU common army headquarters, and as a seed of it a medical command that will coordinate responses to actions of medical troops of each country during the international operation. Berlin and Paris want to additionally strengthen personally and technically the Eurocorps which currently is about 1000 soldiers (“Niemcy i Francja stawiają na europejską armię”).

4. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE EU SECURITY STRATEGY

The European security strategy is the basic program defining how the European Union intends to provide security to its citizens and member states. It is made up of the document entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy” approved by the European Council at the meeting in Brussels in December 2003 (European Council 324-333).

This document, commonly referred to as the Solana Strategy, became rapidly outdated. The European Union had barely begun conducting crisis response operations and took up the task of working out a new treaty which was to become the Constitution for Europe, when Europe –and the rest of the Western world– was engulfed by the financial and economic crisis. When, after a few years, the EU began to emerge from the crisis, it turned out that deep changes had taken place in the international order. The voice of the new emerging powers –who, on the whole, had not only come out of
the crisis unscathed, but with an enhanced international position—began to sound ever louder. Russia, who had been one of the EU’s strategic partners, embraced a policy of force and of breaking international law. Moreover, earlier threats and challenges—such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and immigration to EU countries—grew. The European Security Strategy became an increasingly outdated guidepost for the policy of the EU and many of its member states, who were much weakened by the economic crisis and the rationalization of their policies (Biscop).

Already during the course of the financial crisis, the first attempts were made to bring up to date the European security strategy or to formulate a new one that would be adequate for the rapidly changing European security environment. The first step in this direction was the adoption by the European Council in December 2008 of the report of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, about the implementation of the European Security Strategy. The new document, entitled *Providing Security in a Changing World* (Doc. No. S407/08), assessed the realization of the previous strategy contained proposals aimed at the improvement of its implementation and aiming to supplement it.

The Solana report mentioned as new threats to international security: internet crime, dependence on energy supplies, compound climate change and the financial crisis. It admitted that the ESS from 2003 had not been fully implemented and stated that “to build a secure Europe “in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now”.

It should be noted that the critical opinions formulated by experts and politicians, including Polish ones, often omit that fact that, after 2003, the European Union worked out a number of sectoral strategies related to ensuring security in various areas. Such program documents include the European Union's sectoral strategies in the areas: of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (12 December 2003), fighting terrorism (30 November 2005), the internal security of the European Union (25 March 2010), EU cyber security (7 February 2013), energy security (28 May 2014), and maritime security (24 June 2014).

In EU member states, there was an awareness of the need to work out a new comprehensive security and defense strategy (Lasheras et al.; Biscop, Howarth & Giegerich; De Vasconcelos; Zięba 2010: 146-150). Opinions to that effect were particularly actively formulated in Poland. It is only in late 2011, however, two years after publications by independent experts, that the National Security Bureau recognized the need to review the European Security Strategy (Koziej 19-40). Then, in February 2012, President Bronisław Komorowski, speaking during the 48th Munich Security Conference, called on the European Union to take up work on a new security strategy. He stated that the revitalization of EU efforts in the security sphere should begin with
taking up the long postponed work on the Union’s security strategy, in “synergetic collaboration with the United States and NATO, with Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe”. Characteristically, the Polish president mentioned as one of the motives of his proposal the U.S. announcement (from the end of 2011) to reduce its military presence in Europe. At the same time he made the reservation that NATO must remain a platform of strategic unity for countries on both sides of the Atlantic, as a link connecting Europe with North America (Zięba 2013: 105).

Progress in the direction of formulating a new EU general security strategy UE was happening. By December 2013 the European Council mandated High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini not to deliver a new ESS, but to ‘do something’ about strategy by producing a report on the changes in the global environment and the challenges and opportunities arising for the EU. An important voice in the debate under way was the above mentioned expert group report entitled “More Union in European Defence” drawn under the leadership of Javier Solana, and made public in Brussels on 9 March 2015. Next in June 2015 the European Council bound the High Representative, who will to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with member states, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016 (Tocci 115-120).

If it wishes to be a comprehensive security policy actor, the European Union should clearly speak up in military matters. The amended EU general security strategy should also be supplemented with a military strategy which, at the present stage, seems to be indispensable in order to define the priorities, principles and methods to conduct crisis response and territorial defense operations. It is a matter for the future to formulate a defense doctrine, and this need arises from the alliance solidarity clause of the casus foederis type which is contained in art. 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty and which binds member states to assistance and support each other with all available means in case of armed aggression on one of them.

The elaboration of a new EU military strategy should be guided by a doctrine leading to the transformation of the member state’s armed forces so that expeditionary capability would be in the hands of the Union as a whole and not its individual members. Finally, member states should find a way to create a permanent European army capable to provide for joint territorial defense as called for by the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty. In stressing the expeditionary and defense aspects, duplicate areas of responsibility should be reduced and more mobile capabilities as part of the present ‘joint’ budget should be created, especially within the framework of the permanent structural collaboration and enhanced cooperation provided by the Lisbon Treaty. Of course closer defense cooperation with the USA and NATO is also needed.
The basic pre-condition, however, is reinforcing EU political unity, which was disturbed by the crisis and the national particular interests within the European Union. If the EU wished to act effectively on matters of foreign, security and defense policy, it needs to decide to act as a single actor, as required by the polycentric and increasingly differentiated world. There is thus a need for political will and for joint action on the part of all EU member states. Only such a Europe can be a suitable partner for the United States and for other powers. The EU can begin to rebuild its shaken political unity by taking steps to define its common interests and working out a new comprehensive and global foreign and security strategy, along with its defense component.

Undoubtedly, the European Union is a security actor. It did not attain a sufficient level of strategic maturity and independence, however. Its security and defense policy is neither a true common policy nor a true defense policy. The EU rather exports security beyond its borders, in the last few years mainly onto the African continent. It isn’t able to build a strong defense component for its security policy, the more so as it is much weakened by the financial and economic crisis. On the other hand, until 2015, the EU ensured security within its borders relatively well until it was engulfed with the great wave of Middle East and North Africa immigrants. It has at its disposal the largest array of ‘soft’ instruments of security, and has no equal in this respect among other international actors. It will be a long time, however, before the EU adds to them effective and respect-inspiring ‘hard’ security instruments in the shape of a European Army.

According to the timetable established in Brussels, on 28 June 2016 the European Council approved submitted by Monika Mogherini A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, entitled Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. This document (EUGS) consists four parts. In the first they were defined interests of citizens of the Union, in the second the principles guiding EU’s external action, in the third the priorities of these external action, and in the last part –how the EU should implement its priorities moving from vision to action.

The new strategy defined primarily common interests of the Union and its member states: security of citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order. Furthermore has defined the principles that will guide the EU: European unity, cooperation with others, responsibility, enhancing external partnerships.

To promote the shared interests, adhering to clear principles, the EU will pursue five priorities: a) the security of the Union, b) state and societal resilience to EU’s East (stretching into Central Asia) and South (stretching down to Central Africa), c) an integrated approach to conflicts, d) cooperative regional orders, e) global governance for the 21st century.

The EUGS declares the EU will pursue above mentioned priorities by mobilizing its unparalleled networks, economic weight and all the tools at its disposal in
a coherent way. To fulfill the defined goals, the EU must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union - across its external policies, between member states and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of its policies (“Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”).

The document envisages a review of existing sectoral strategies and to develop new thematic or geographical strategies, in line with the political priorities of the global strategy. Unlike the ESS in 2003, the EUGS itself already provides a systematic process of implementation and review. It announces an annual reflection on the state of play, “pointing out where further implementation must be sought,” though not a systematic overall review. The strategy announced “A new process of strategic reflection will be launched whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary” (p. 51), so not automatically every five years (Biscop 2016: 4). The EUGS will also be subject to periodic review in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. In June 2016 the European Council adopted the document presented by F. Mogherini and invited the High Representative, the Council and the Commission to continue work in this area. One of the urgent tasks to be done is to prepare a European action plan for defense. This task was undertaken by the meeting of EU defense ministers in Bratislava on 27 September 2016.

The EUGS combines internal and external security of the EU; assumes that EU’s home security depends on peace beyond its borders. Therefore, to ensure the internal security of the Union, Global Strategy provides for external actions on a larger scale. This new strategy was adopted when the European Union found itself in a crisis, a few days after Brexit and while the Visegrad Group argues in favor of loosening the Union. It is a specific initiative to advance the supporters of the European project. Like Javier Solana said “Without their voice it would be heard only votes for the fact that Europe should be less and less. In the coming months we must carry forward our security policy and implement the objectives of this strategy. Those of us who care about Europe to go forward, they cannot remain silent today” (Solana).

REFERENCES


NOTES


2 Created in 1955, the WEU was a distinct organization whose function was to be NATO’s European pillar and, in time, also the EU’s defence component. Most EU member states belonged to the WEU.

3 The Petersberg Tasks (missions) were instituted by a decision of the WEU’s Ministerial Council on 19 June 1992, as operations whose scope went beyond the dispositions of article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. They were made up humanitarian and rescue operations conducted using civilian and military resources, peacekeeping tasks and combat missions in crisis management, including peacemaking, initially taken up by the WEU beyond the area of its member states. In accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon, such operations include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance missions, conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization operations. All those missions may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism on their territories.